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Trypanosoma cruzi causes Chagas disease. Humans become infected through T. cruzi-infected insect bites, transmission from mother to fetus, organ transplantation, and blood transfusion. An estimated 300,000 people in the United States and Canada are infected; most infections occur in those emigrating from South America but a small number of autochthonous cases have also emerged in the United States. Once infected, low-level parasitemia persists indefinitely. T. cruzi remains viable in stored whole blood and citrated blood samples stored at refrigerator and room temperatures, respectively. In Mexico and Central and South America, approximately 20% of transfusion recipients of parasitemic blood become infected.1 Studies conducted in Miami and Los Angeles in the 1990s found T. cruzi seroprevalence rates of 1 per 7500 to 1 per 9000 donors. Interestingly, none of the 18 recipients of blood from a subsequently identified seropositive donor had evidence of infection.2 In contrast, in a more recently reported study conducted in Mexico, four of nine surviving recipients of blood from T. cruzi-infected donors were in turn confirmed seropositive.3 In the United States and Canada, seven transfusion-associated Chagas cases are known to have occurred since the 1980s. Six involved platelet (PLT) transfusions; the component in the seventh case remains unknown. The six infected donors were born or resided in endemic Latin American countries. In light of increasing immigration of persons to the United States from endemic regions and the current paradigm of a “zero-risk” blood supply, various mitigation strategies for preventing transfusion-associated Chagas cases emerged. Donor history screening alone was rejected in the United States since only three-quarters of infected donors are identified via questioning and thousands of noninfected donors are inconvenienced. Leukoreduction showed modest benefit. Serologic screening, therefore, became the default position. The latter message, transmitted to potential test-kit manufacturers by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) at the Blood Product Advisory Committee meeting in September 1989 and more specifically in September 2002, led to development, clinical trials, and subsequent approval of a T. cruzi screening test in December 2006. A second test, in 2010, received approval. Universal screening began in the United States in 2007, before an FDA mandate. Spain implemented selective testing in 2005 and Canada in 2009 to 2010. In 2009, after acquiring 2 years of universal testing data, many blood centers in the United States moved to a “test every donor once” strategy, retaining universal testing in selected areas in the south where incident cases may occur.4 As reported in this issue of TRANSFUSION, Custer and coworkers5 found a seroprevalence rate of 1:33,039 donations and 1:13,292 donors among 2.9 million donations and 1.2 million unique donors tested between January 2007 and December 2009. Risk factors included those born in Mexico (1:800 donors) and Central or South America (1:200). Prevalence varied by geographic region and was highest at donation sites in the Central Coast of California (1:5200 donors), Las Vegas, and parts of Texas. Seropositive donors cited bites from reduviid bugs and having lived in rural areas of endemic countries. Approximately 20% of confirmed seropositive donors had “no known risk factors” including travel in endemic countries and thus are presumed autochthonous cases. Cost-effectiveness analysis showed $757,000 per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) saved. Cantey and colleagues6 investigated the potential for T. cruzi autochthonous transmission in seropositive confirmed blood donors who had not lived outside the United States and donated to the Blood Systems and American Red Cross, United States T. cruzi Infection Study (USTC). Through April 30, 2010, these blood collection agencies identified 1084 T. cruzi-confirmed seropositive donors from approximately 29 million donations (1:26,700). Fifty-four were eligible for the USTC and 37 enrolled. Enrollees were divided into a group whose tests were confirmed by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) serologic assays (n = 15) and those with tests nonconfirmed at the CDC (n = 22). Only two of the latter had consistent repeat-reactive results with the initially approved T. cruzi antibody test, but 21 of 21 tested by the second approved assay were negative. Among the concordant group, eight traveled to an endemic country and three to rural areas in an endemic country, but none resided there more than 2 weeks. All lived in a state with a T. cruzi vector or a known infected mammalian reservoir and most participated in work-related or leisure activities in those states. By extrapolating USTC data, U.S. vector-borne cases approximate 1:354,000 to 1:485,000 tested. Benjamin and colleagues7 reviewed reported transfusion-transmitted T. cruzi cases in North America and Spain: seven from the United States, five from Spain, two from Canada, and one from Mexico. Implicated donors were born in Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay. All definite cases involved PLTs, from either a whole blood or an apheresis donation. Irradiation and leukoreduction did not provide protection. In 4 years of testing and lookback of recipients of seropositive donors, the American Red Cross found only one person definitively infected by transfusion, a recipient of a leukoreduced whole blood–derived PLT concentrate. Overall, 110 recipients were tested; only nine had received PLTs. In England, screening for T. cruzi at-risk donors began in 1998.8 Through 2005, donors identified because of residence or travel to rural areas or exposure to primitive living conditions in T. cruzi-endemic areas were accepted for donation only if they were seronegative 6 months after return from an endemic area. Before 2005, at-risk donors provided samples that were tested and then were permitted to donate if seronegative. After 2005, donors provided a full donation that was tested subsequently. Only three donors of the 38,583 tested since 1998 had confirmed-positive results. Seemingly, this approach provides an estimated donor seroprevalence rate for judging overall transfusion-related T. cruzi risks without the cost of universal testing. Unclear are the overall positive and negative predictive values of this strategy. The post-2005 strategy permitted collection of more than 15,000 donations, found seronegative, that would have been deferred previously. Overall, including the manuscripts in this issue of TRANSFUSION, the T. cruzi testing narrative represents a positive outcome. Transfusion thought leaders perceived a threat, reacted, and implemented a test with progressive changes in response to newly acquired data. Nonetheless, some major lessons for future planning emerged. First, there is a lesson related to the commercial realities of test-kit manufacture. In the United States, before test approval, blood collection agency scientific leaders vociferously advocated test implementation. This support set the stage for test-kit suppliers to dominate reimbursement negotiations by asserting that such testing incrementally improved blood safety. When selective testing appeared imminent, the dominant test-kit manufacturer moved to protect its financial interests in response to the strategy change despite multiple discussions about alternatives to universal testing before the initial investigational new drug clinical trials. Selective testing algorithms do not fit well with a test-kit manufacturer's business model, which is based on achieving recovery of test development and licensure costs and earning shareholder return as quickly as possible through a universal testing approach. Pursuant to this model, any savings realized from the lower volume of selective testing must be partially, if not fully, offset by higher test-kit prices. For the future, we suggest establishing interim analysis criteria and “stop” rules before initiating infectious disease test clinical trials that include ongoing financial and sensitivity and specificity analysis. Second, there is a growing consensus that a zero-risk paradigm for blood manufacturing poses a cost to the rest of the health care system that is unacceptable and unaffordable.9, 10 Therefore, where data suggest that transfusion transmission from even confirmed positive donors is a rare event, as is the case with T. cruzi in North America, the risk response needs to be proportional to that assessment and must always be placed in the context of other risks facing the system. Viewed from that perspective, the most reasonable T. cruzi testing algorithm, based on the evidence, would be to test first-time PLT donors only. We urge consideration of reviewing other current infectious disease testing strategies, for example, reevaluating HBsAg testing in light of HBV NAT and anti-HBc test results. We suggest reevaluation of repeated testing of all donors for HTLV in the face of leukoreduction: €45.2 million/QALY testing all donations and €2–23 million/QALY testing new donors only.11 Additionally, we recommend a risk reduction strategy for Babesia—the cause of many more cases of transfusion transmission than T. cruzi. Given the limits on Babesia's geographic and seasonal transmission, an algorithm other than universal testing (if an assay became available) would appear appropriate but very difficult to construct. Third, as highlighted by the Chagas experience, the default hypothesis regarding incremental test addition no longer serves the blood system well and indeed may pose risk, particularly because it is not sustainable. Pathogen reduction technology offers an alternative approach and makes sense as a mitigation measure in light of the threat of emerging pathogens such as Babesia, dengue, and others. Regulatory authorities have a role to play in ensuring that the new paradigm is adopted in a safe, effective, timely, and risk-intelligent manner, ultimately phasing out requirements for certain tests no longer necessary once pathogen reduction is implemented. Admittedly, T. cruzi test implementation in the United States has received mixed reviews; some consider it a partial success while others condemn the scenario as a partial failure. Regardless, T. cruzi test development provides an opportunity for maximizing progressive, modern approaches to infectious disease testing that transitions our discipline from the antiquated zero-risk paradigm espoused in the mid-1980s to a more modern approach. As the evolving response to Chagas testing demonstrates, blood safety issues are not one-dimensional. They raise a multifactorial set of risks that must be balanced to protect the safety and sustainability of the blood supply and to ensure the rational allocation of resources “vein to vein” and across health care generally. Mitigation strategies are needed that move beyond the current outmoded template and that address the full spectrum of medical, commercial, regulatory, and societal risks that frame our interventions. None.
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Menitove et al. (2012) studied this question.
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