This article demonstrates enhanced power (P) and electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA) attack resistance of standard (unprotected) 128-bit advanced encryption standard (AES) engines with parallel (P-AES, 128-bit) and serial (S-AES, 8-bit) datapaths and a 128-bit SIMON engine with the bit-serial (1-bit) datapath by an on-die security-aware all-digital low-dropout (DLDO) regulator. The proposed DLDO improves SCA resistance using control-loop-induced perturbations in a nominal DLDO, enhanced by a random switching noise injector (SNI) by power-stage control and a randomized reference voltage (R-VREF) generator coupled with all-digital clock modulation (ADCM). SCA performed on the measured power/EM signatures acquired from a 130-nm CMOS testchip demonstrates up to 25× reduction in test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) leakage for P-AES and 3579×, 2182×, and 500× increase in minimum-traces-to-disclose (MTD) 80% of the subkeys for P-AES, S-AES, and SIMON cores, respectively, with respect to correlation power analysis (CPA) and correlation EM analysis (CEMA).
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Singh et al. (2019) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 2 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: