Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized abnormal return of 10% to 15% only when public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. A similar portfolio created to capture the importance of internal governance generates annualized abnormal returns of 8%, though only in the presence of “high” vulnerability to takeovers. The complementarity effect exists for firms with lower industry‐adjusted leverage and is stronger for smaller firms.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Cremers et al. (2005) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: