Fare dodging and the strong arm of the law

In this paper we discuss a controlled experiment on the enforcement of sanctioning for fare evasion in trains in the Netherlands. The experiment ran for 2 years, and the extent to which sanctions were effectively imposed was compared for non-chronic fare evaders in two regions. Travellers caught without a ticket who had not paid on the spot were divided into two conditions. In the (regular) control condition, the Dutch railways attempted to recover the cost of the unpaid ticket, plus a small penalty, followed by regular, civil law, debt collection procedures. In the experimental condition, the efforts by the Dutch railways were followed by penalty collection procedures by the Dutch Ministry of Justice’s fine collection agency. The results under the experimental condition were worse than those under the standard procedure. Both conditions have (often lengthy) follow-up procedures entailing criminal prosecution, which are not reported upon here. We discuss the implications and the questions that these findings raise.