This study assesses the extent to which German public opinion on foreign and defense policy has changed in the years following two major events: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and Donald Trump’s reelection in November 2024. Drawing on panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), we trace trajectories in foreign policy postures and issue-specific policy attitudes across a core observation window from December 2021 to November 2025. We find, first, substantial stability in broad postures, though with subtle indications of weakening military restraint and increasing isolationism. Second, the marked issue-specific shifts observed in 2022 largely persist rather than reverting to preinvasion levels, especially regarding higher defense spending and a more confrontational policy toward Russia. Third, partisan differences have intensified: Mainstream-party supporters drive the trend toward less restraint, whereas fringe-party identifiers and nonpartisans remain more skeptical of military force and display higher isolationism. Taken together, the findings suggest that major events have elicited qualified reactions: (still) no wholesale Zeitenwende at the level of mass belief systems, yet incremental, politically meaningful change under sustained geopolitical pressure.
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Mader et al. (2026) studied this question.
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