Is the Beginningless Grounded? On Duration, the Temporal Idol, and the Ground No Length Supplies

This essay asks whether a universe without a first temporal moment would thereby be without a Ground. It argues that beginninglessness and ontological independence belong to different questions. A temporal series may have no first term while remaining wholly derivative, because endless duration does not confer aseity or non-derivative actuality. The argument distinguishes temporal origin, infinity, and dependence as separate axes, and treats duration as a magnitude within temporal history rather than as a route beyond the created order. Aquinas provides the central historical witness: a world without a demonstrable temporal beginning would not therefore be uncreated, since creation concerns dependence in being rather than a first instant. The essay then distinguishes a beginningless world’s sempiternity from divine eternity: the former would remain an endless succession, whereas the latter is without succession altogether. The Ground is therefore not the earliest or longest-lasting member of the temporal series, but that upon which the actuality of the whole series depends.