Normative Theorising and Empirical Studies on Intuitions: A Case Study on Moral Luck

The relevance of empirical studies on intuitions to normative theorising remains contested. This paper proposes a framework to structure the debate. It argues that empirical studies on intuitions should be classified according to which features of intuitions they illuminate: aetiology, function, robustness, universality, and substance. It also proposes general and specific approaches to advance the discussion. The paper then applies the framework to the moral luck debate. First, it considers how empirical studies regarding intuitions’ aetiology and function can impact our method of relying on intuitions. Next, it illustrates how studies on the aetiology and function of the causation intuition may reshape the moral luck debate by weakening the intuitive challenge to the control intuition. In so doing, it demonstrates how empirical studies on intuitions can have significant implications for normative disputes more generally.