It is often argued that no individual can make a difference to the amount of harm caused by climate change on her own, even though climate change results from all our emissions taken together. This “problem of inconsequentialism” is especially worrying for act consequentialism, since if the theory permits individuals to continue emitting greenhouse gases, then it seemingly fails to provide us with the tools for mitigating climate change. In response to this problem, Voiron and Puumala (2025) have recently proposed that act consequentialists should adopt what they call a Climate Esoteric Morality (CEM). Adopting CEM involves promoting faux non-consequentialist principles, exaggerating existing consequentialist principles, and refraining from criticizing non-consequentialist principles. The aim is to ensure that individuals act in ways that reduce the harm caused by climate change, despite the problem of inconsequentialism. In this article, I argue that Voiron and Puumala fail to demonstrate that act consequentialists should adopt CEM.
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Simon Rosenqvist (2026) studied this question.
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