Merit, autonomy, and corruption: the moderating role of anti-corruption institutions in Africa

This study examines how merit appointments and bureaucratic autonomy influence corruption in African governments, and whether the independence and capability of anti-corruption institutions condition these relationships. Using two-way fixed effects regression to analyze a panel of 486 African countries from 2013–2021, we find that bureaucratic autonomy is negatively associated with corruption, while the relationship between merit appointments and corruption depends on the capability of anti-corruption institutions: where such institutions lack the capability to hold politicians and bureaucrats accountable, merit appointments are positively associated with corruption; as the capability of anti-corruption institutions increases, this relationship weakens and can eventually reverse. Neither the independence nor the capability of anti-corruption institutions is independently associated with corruption. These findings suggest that professionalizing civil service hiring without corresponding investments to bolster the capability of anti-corruption institutions can backfire and point to the conditions under which anti-corruption reforms are likely to succeed.