Viktor Orbán’s populism, Russian disinformation, and learned helplessness in Hungary

The extant literature on populism and disinformation assumes that populist leaders rhetorically appeal to the people, proclaim to defend their interests, and enhance their status and self-esteem. The populist electorate buys into populist rhetoric. If we take Victor Orbán as an example of a highly successful populist leader, the empirical evidence does not appear to support this general assumption. Our empirical analysis centers on the 2022 parliamentary election in Hungary, which occurred a couple of months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Opinion polls at the time indicated that the Hungarian people thought positively of the EU, were concerned with Russian expansionism, and generally supported the Ukrainians in their struggle. Yet, Orbán’s rhetoric was highly critical of Ukraine and the EU, and he promoted rapprochement with Russia. We argue that, among many Hungarians, disinformation narratives generated ignorance and passivity — an emotional state of learned helplessness — rather than polarization and radicalization. The paper explains the concept of learned helplessness and illustrates it through interviews with Hungarian citizens. Whether learned helplessness, rather than polarization and radicalization, contribute to the voting behavior of the electorate has important implications for foreign policy.