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Generative AI has revived a neglected question in copyright law: why must authors be human? Courts and copyright offices have largely answered through statutory interpretation, but the underlying jurisprudence remains underdeveloped. This article draws on Kant’s theory of publication and spontaneity to argue that copyright protects an imputable communicative act. A copyright work transcends its status as a produced object to exist fundamentally as a public address attributable to a rational subject capable of authorising its communication. The article grounds this account in the architecture of Kant’s Doctrine of Right: the mandate that authorises publication is a relation between persons, modelled on the Roman mandatum, and the standing from which it issues is an exercise of the author’s innate right of communicative freedom. Current AI systems possess the capacity to generate outputs, yet they remain incapable of originating communicative acts or issuing mandates in the Kantian sense. The article further develops a Mandate Test for human-AI collaboration and concludes that the human authorship requirement follows from the nature of authorship itself, not merely from historical practice or legislative convention.
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Gaurav Dahiya (2026) studied this question.
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