Metaphorical (De)vices and the standard of comparison

We can learn about the epistemic dimension of metaphor through considering how it allows for the possibility of deception. A relatively straightforward account of the connection treats the epistemic value of a metaphor in terms of the propositions it implicates. However, such an account is not available to theories of metaphor such as Davidson’s [1978. “What Metaphors Mean.” Critical Inquiry 5 (1): 31–47], which understand metaphor-interpretation as engaging in an activity of comparison rather than extracting content from such an activity. Our aim is to provide an alternative epistemology of metaphor for those who are more sympathetic to a Davidsonian approach. We argue that metaphor is best thought of in non-propositional terms, using not just verbal metaphors but also pictorial and enacted metaphors (through a discussion of caricature and impersonation). We show how comparison itself can be assessed as more or less epistemically gainful by invoking standards for comparison modelled along lines borrowed from a position in aesthetics – a Humean account of the standard of taste. We show how an account of deceptive metaphors falls out of this – as a case of being deceived or misled by someone who presents themselves as in a position to provide apt metaphors.