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Drawing on the case of Melchor de Navarra, viceroy of Peru from 1681 to 1689, this article qualifies the thesis that viceregal patronage in the Spanish monarchy declined in the late seventeenth century. The instruments that Navarra employed for political management—particularly the provision of corregimientos—reveal that, under his rule, patronage did not recede: It became almost hegemonic and served as a channel of illicit gain for him and his circles. This conclusion rests on a relational approach and on the cross-reading of administrative and notarial sources in Spain and Peru, which make it possible to reconstruct this sphere of business with a breadth and contextual depth not previously achieved. The study sheds light on the exercise, negotiation, and legitimation of power, and on the blurred boundaries between public service and private gain in the early modern Hispanic world.
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Rubén Gálvez Martín (2026) studied this question.
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