ASEAN has long adhered to the non-interference doctrine in members’ domestic political crises. What explains its unusually assertive response to Myanmar’s 2021 coup and subsequent civil war, including the adoption of the Five-Point Consensus and the exclusion of junta leaders from ASEAN summits? This article explains this shift through the interaction between US–China strategic competition and the Myanmar crisis’ spillover effects. It argues that US–China strategic competition for leadership in the international and Indo-Pacific regional order, combined with Washington’s instrumental use of democracy, imposed growing pressure on ASEAN’s centrality and legitimacy. Uneven reputational and cross-border pressures shaped divergent preferences among members, with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore favouring a firmer response and Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam prioritising non-intervention. Bargaining through ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making process translated these preferences into collective policy. Through process tracing, this article shows how US–China strategic competition and expanding spillovers of the Myanmar crisis shaped ASEAN’s policy evolution from diplomatic appeals to institutionalised consultation and, ultimately, the junta leaders’ exclusion from ASEAN summits. By theorising the conditions under which ASEAN recalibrates and moves beyond the non-interference doctrine, this article contributes to a more dynamic understanding of regional norms, crisis management, and institutional adaptation under great-power competition.
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Wei et al. (2026) studied this question.
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