Expected utility maximization with unbounded utilities implies that tiny probabilities of huge positive or negative payoffs can dominate overall expected‐utility calculations. In other words, it leads to fanaticism . Fanaticism is counterintuitive, as illustrated by cases such as Pascal's Mugging and the St. Petersburg paradox. However, these cases do not illustrate the most counterintuitive implications of fanaticism. This paper shows, in the form of a dialogue, how a world filled with fanatical agents can be almost certain to be devoid of value—and by their own choice. The case presented here does not involve infinities, and it avoids the criticisms that have been raised against earlier cases.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Petra Kosonen (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: