Evolutionary Dynamics of Blockchain-Enabled Green Enterprise Financing: A Tripartite Game Analysis

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Despite their rapid growth in recent years, green enterprises continue to face financing constraints and high financing costs due to long investment cycles, delayed returns, high uncertainty, and persistent information asymmetry. This study examines how blockchain technology reshapes green enterprise financing through the strategic interactions among green enterprises, financial institutions, and the government. We develop tripartite evolutionary game models under traditional and blockchain-enabled financing scenarios, derive replicator dynamic equations to identify equilibrium points and assess their stability, and conduct MATLAB-based numerical simulations to examine system evolution. The analysis further investigates how the net benefits of blockchain adoption and government subsidies influence stakeholders’ strategic choices and evolutionary trajectories. The results show that blockchain empowerment relaxes the conditions for achieving Pareto optimality and facilitates the transition of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) from (no financing, no lending, no intervention) toward (financing, lending, intervention). Greater net benefits from blockchain adoption strengthen stakeholders’ incentives to adopt proactive strategies and accelerate convergence toward the Pareto-optimal state. Government subsidies, however, are not monotonically beneficial and must remain within an appropriate range to maintain system stability. These findings highlight the importance of promoting the effective application of blockchain technology in green financing while designing well-calibrated government subsidy policies, thereby fostering coordinated interactions among green enterprises, financial institutions, and the government and supporting the sustainable development of green enterprises.