Wittgenstein and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification

Rachael Wiseman (2019) has challenged the standard understanding of Wittgenstein’s Blue Book discussion of ‘two different cases in the use of the word “I”’. Wittgenstein is standardly read as identifying an important distinction between the use of ‘I’ as object, which involves the recognition of a person and is vulnerable to errors of misidentification, and the use of ‘I’ as subject, which involves no recognition of a person and is immune to error through misidentification. Wiseman argues that Wittgenstein does not in fact endorse such a distinction but warns against it. She contends that the standard interpretation ignores the context of the passage in the Blue Book discussion of solipsism and that it misunderstands the nature of self-consciousness. This paper defends the standard reading of Wittgenstein against Wiseman’s revisionary interpretation. It shows how it fits with his discussion of solipsism. And it defends the conception of self-consciousness it involves.