Geopolitical Weaponization of Energy: Implications for European Energy Security and NATO Strategic Preparedness

Energy can become an instrument of geopolitical coercion when asymmetric dependencies, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and limited resilience allow energy resources, supplies, prices, technologies, or infrastructure to be strategically exploited. This study examines these mechanisms and their implications for European energy security and NATO strategic preparedness, using Romania as an eastern-flank case study. A coercion–vulnerability–resilience framework is developed by integrating geopolitical assessment, energy-dependency analysis, critical-infrastructure vulnerability, scenario analysis, and quantitative measurement constructs. The study operationalizes energy coercion through a six-stage pathway linking dependence creation, signaling, coercive action, domestic transmission effects, and negotiation. The Romanian case indicates that energy security depends not only on domestic resource availability but also on infrastructure protection, diversification, storage, system flexibility, investment implementation, cybersecurity, and regional interconnection. The composite indices presented in the study are synthetic methodological demonstrations rather than empirically estimated national scores, while the empirical analysis relies on referenced statistical, institutional, and macroeconomic evidence. The framework shows how resilience measures can reduce exploitable dependencies and strengthen Romania’s contribution to European energy security and NATO strategic preparedness.