Economic sanctions and the politics of humanitarianism

Economic sanctions have been deployed with increasing frequency by major economies, particularly by the United States, solidifying their role as a central instrument of foreign policy. Many countries experiencing the most severe and protracted humanitarian crises are simultaneously subject to long-standing sanctions regimes, creating a consequential intersection between coercive economic policy and structural vulnerability. While significant effort has been devoted to designing targeted sanctions accompanied by humanitarian exemptions intended to protect civilian populations, these mechanisms often fail to operate as intended. The expanded use of sanctions across crisis countries alongside the exceptional reduction in aid is aggravating humanitarian vulnerabilities and needs. This article examines a central paradox of modern sanctions policy: provisions designed to safeguard civilian populations frequently fail to function as intended and advances the argument that sanctioning governments not only impose formal economic restrictions but often deploy a parallel form of state-driven derisking through the contraction or withdrawal of humanitarian assistance. In this sense, the reduction of aid operates as an indirect yet consequential punitive instrument of economic statecraft.