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On 13 February 2026, the Reserve Bank of India issued landmark amendments to the Commercial Banks Credit Facilities Directions, permitting Indian banks to finance corporate acquisitions for the first time. This reform enables bank-led leveraged buyouts and reshapes India's M&A financing landscape, yet it imposes a Rs. 500 crore net worth floor and a three-year profitability record that structurally excludes over 2.4 lakh DPIIT-recognised startups, most of which are pre-profitability and sub-Rs. 100 crore in net worth. This paper argues the framework entrenches a funding valley of death for startup M&A, and makes three further contributions. First, it shows the Competition Commission of India's 2024 deal value threshold operates independently, exposing bank-financed startup acquisitions to parallel competition scrutiny regardless of the RBI's floor, and interrogates the resulting "killer acquisition" tension. Second, it examines whether SEBI's open-offer exemptions should be recalibrated for listed startup targets financed under a reformed protocol. Third, it proposes a new paragraph 170H tiered acquisition finance track, situated within a broader case for formal RBI-CCI-SEBI coordination, tested against comparative practice in the United States, the European Union, Singapore, and illustrative bank-financed consolidations abroad. The conclusion of the paper is that the Rs. The 500 crore threshold is indicative of a defensible, India-specific prudential judgment, and not international benchmarking, but that prudential judgment should now be construed in conjunction with competition and securities law to ensure that one exclusion is not substituted by regulatory risk that is nonexistent.
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- et al. (2026) studied this question.
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