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Deep learning-based encrypted traffic classification has been widely adopted to support a range of critical operational and security tasks. However, it also exposes a vulnerability to backdoor attacks. Most existing backdoor defenses originate from computer vision and rely on continuous gradient-based trigger reverse engineering, which is mathematically incompatible with the discrete packet structures of network traffic. Existing attack studies in this domain either overlook defense evaluation entirely or benchmark against these incompatible mechanisms, leaving two critical questions unanswered: whether any defense mechanism can effectively detect backdoors in encrypted traffic classifiers, and whether these defenses can truly withstand a well-crafted attack. To answer these questions, we first establish a rigorous and traffic-compatible backdoor defense evaluation framework. State-of-the-art backdoor defenses that leverage high-order statistics and topological dynamics from computer vision are adapted to process discrete packet sequences. Under this framework, we then propose HALO (Hierarchical Alignment for Latent-feature Obfuscation), a novel backdoor attack designed to counter these defenses. HALO couples an auto-regressive trigger generator with a hierarchical latent feature obfuscation mechanism. By aligning triggered flows with the natural structure of the target class across multiple network layers, it renders them indistinguishable from normal traffic in the feature space. Our evaluation shows that while these adapted defenses effectively detect existing attacks, they largely fail against HALO. These results reveal the inadequacy of current backdoor defenses in encrypted traffic classification.
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Wang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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