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This paper studies the influence of corporate contributions on political selection and electoral outcomes. To identify the effects, I analyze a Brazilian reform that banned firms’ contributions using a weighted difference-in-differences strategy, exploiting variation in candidates’ reliance on corporate funding prior to the reform. I find that the ban fosters political competition by encouraging challengers and new candidates to run for office. Instead, the reform penalizes incumbents funded by firms by decreasing their likelihood of re-election. These adverse effects are particularly pronounced among underperforming incumbents. I also show that firms tend to donate more to mayors associated with higher corruption, a pattern that does not emerge for other donor types.
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Julieta Peveri (2026) studied this question.
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