Experience, Intelligence, and Self Within Experience: Definitions, Conditional Theorems, and Thought Experiments for a Structural Account

What relates experience, intelligence and selfhood, and what prevents one from being inferred from another? We develop a common vocabulary within Unified Consciousness Theory (UCT), distinguishing actual processes, complete organization, finite descriptions, task-relative capability, functional self-models, self-related feeling and the conceptual I. Structural-experiential identity is stated as an interpretive axiom rather than presented as a consequence of mathematical notation. Self-related organization is treated within experience; no additional owner is introduced to generate experience. Three conditional results organize the argument. Complete organizational type constrains a fixed capability profile. A representation determines complete experiential type exactly when it preserves all complete organizational type distinctions, whereas a selected target requires only its own distinctions. A finite rewiring construction shows that exact sensorimotor prediction can fail to determine attachment to an independently specified physical assembly. These results use established mathematics; their contribution here is a common account of which explanatory substitutions are valid. Ancestral continuity, calculating devices, a human formation implementing an agent, and copying and rewiring supply the motivating problems and counterexamples. We also specify a method for auditing definitions, joint premises, source lineage and research direction, addressing a failure that dependency graphs alone cannot prevent. The result is a conditional foundation for further inquiry, not a claim that phenomenology has been independently established from functional performance. Theoretical preprint. Conditional formal results and finite computational checks are distinguished from empirical evidence. Substantial ChatGPT assistance under the author's direction is disclosed. Not peer reviewed. No new human, animal, or pretrained language-model experiment is reported, and C1 is not claimed to be empirically validated.