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This paper proposes a hypothesis that explains the cognitive difference between autism spectrum (ASD) and typical development (TD) with a single variable: the context dependence of conceptual association. The central claim is that the ASD–TD difference lies not in the ability to connect concept A to concept B, but in the degree to which establishing the activation of B from the activation of A requires summoning the individual context present at the time of learning. Associations that require no context are termed direct associations; those that require summoning context are termed context-mediated associations. Because context-mediated associations speed up with learning and can become indistinguishable from direct associations both externally and introspectively — while the processing route does not change — the hypothesis is testable only by experiments that manipulate context, not by introspection. A two-axis model separating association type from compensation ability may unify the implicit–explicit dissociation in social cognition, reduced generalization, the effect of retrieval support on memory, emotion elicitation, and traits masked by compensation. Two derivative hypotheses concerning the cost of summoning context are derived, offering a single-principle account of resistance to change and narrow-but-deep interest. An exploratory hypothesis proposes that a categorical difference in the association-updating algorithm may lie behind the continuously observed phenotype. Distinguishable predictions and falsification conditions are given for each hypothesis. This is a theoretical proposal by an autistic author, published for collaborative verification with empirical researchers. A Japanese-language version is included as an additional file.
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Kohei Nemoto (2026) studied this question.
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