Phenomenological Exceptionalism

In this paper I investigate a tension within Husserlian phenomenology between phenomenological exceptionalism, according to which phenomenological cognition has an epistemic status superior to that of natural cognition, and the transcendence of our experiences, which appears to follow from Husserl’s theory of perceptual intentionality. I argue that our experiences are transcendent, and that this entails the falsity of phenomenological exceptionalism. I will argue that while de re externalism is true and generates this result, the transcendence of our experiences persists even if we abandon metaphysical realism and externalism itself. I will also argue that the best explanation for our inability to have easy self-knowledge of content in the case of perceptual experiences is that they do not have conceptual content. I conclude by arguing, along with others, that the falsity of phenomenological exceptionalism does not threaten or undermine the main tasks of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology.