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Research on salesforce compensation contract has focused on contract design itself for a long time. However, how contract design influences both production and pricing decisions of a firm is still not explored. This paper attempts to fill this research gap and answer the following questions. If the market demand is not only controlled by salesperson's effort, but also by the firm's pricing decision, how does the private information possessed by the salesforce affect the firm's marketing and operational decisions? Specifically, under the environment of incomplete information, what are the joint optimal contract design, optimal quantity, and pricing decisions? How is the production/inventory quantity decision affected by other decisions? In this research, three scenarios (first best, pooling, and separating) are analysed and closed-form optimal solutions are obtained. Detailed numerical analyses are carried out to gain some further insights into the sensitivity of the optimal solution.
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Yang et al. (2015) studied this question.
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