How do middle-income states select vaccine partners? Projected capacity across sectors in Argentina

How do governments select vaccine-production partners when sector-specific capacity is incomplete? The COVID-19 pandemic made this question especially pressing, as vaccine nationalism constrained external supply and pushed middle-income states to expand domestic production despite unproven capacities. Tracing Argentina’s vaccine strategy from 2020 to 2022, this article develops the concept of projected capacity: a mechanism through which states infer potential capacity in one sector from firms’ resources, credibility, and structural position in another. Policymakers rely on proxies for vaccine-production capacity, including industrial legacies, firm–state familiarity, and alignment with health-sovereignty goals. State selection then provides firms with resources, alliances, and legitimacy, transforming projected capacity into sector-specific structural power. The article contributes to debates in political economy and public policy by showing that structural power is not only a pre-existing source of influence over the state; it can also be created through state decisions that select and support firms.