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In Chaoan He's “Farewell to the Modal Theory of Luck,” he constructs a Frankfurt‐style counterexample to modal theories of luck (LOTTERY*), and he argues that this counterexample obviates standard modalist responses to other prominent counterexamples in the literature. However, as I argue in this reply, the counterexample is not as decisive as He suggests. In section 1, I explicate (i) the modal theory of luck, (ii) He's counterexample, and (iii) a possible modalist response. In section 2, I argue that this response is a version of a strategy that He himself considers effective against non‐Frankfurt‐style counterexamples. If my argument succeeds, then the modal theory remains viable. I do not propose revising the modal theory; rather, I argue that, once we attend to the modal profile of the generating process, standard modal resources suffice to explain the intuition of luck in LOTTERY*.
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Samuel J. M. Kahn (2026) studied this question.
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