Challenging US Nuclear Escalation Dominance in the Indo-Pacific: Escalation Dominance Policy in Confronting Horizontal Escalation Dynamics in Dual Crisis

The Indo-Pacific is entering a phase of nuclear multipolarity in which the United States may face simultaneous crises involving China and North Korea. Existing deterrence theory, largely developed in bilateral settings, offers limited guidance for understanding horizontal escalation dynamics. This article examines whether an escalation-dominance-oriented US nuclear posture can manage horizontal escalation dynamics in a dual-crisis setting. The study provides an analytical framework linking escalation dominance to escalation risks driven by doctrinal orientation, nuclear capability structure and strategic decision-making systems. Applying the analytical framework, this article finds that while escalation dominance may deter vertical escalation in bilateral contexts, it becomes structurally constrained under multipolar conditions. This analysis indicates that because China’s survivable second-strike posture and higher nuclear threshold differ fundamentally from North Korea’s first-use doctrine, second-strike vulnerability and centralised command system, horizontal escalation is likely to originate in North Korea.