Revoking the Explanatory Gap: Humean Skepticism, Recursive Ontology, and the Consensus Replacement of the Consciousness Problem

David Chalmers's "hard problem" of consciousness presupposes three unproven consensuses: mind-matter dualism, first-person privilege, and the explanatory gap. This paper argues that the hard problem is not an objective discovery but a pseudo-problem generated by circular definitions and contradictory premises. Drawing on the formal framework of recursive ontology (S_n = f(Sₙ₋₁, W_n)) proposed in "Experience Precedes Thought," this study conducts a systematic examination of Chalmers's theory through four steps: (1) Publicity constraint and the zombie self-cannibalization dilemma, which expose the self-contradiction of first-person privilege; (2) Conceptual archaeology revealing the explanatory gap as a product of circular definition; (3) Consensus replacement strategy using "reaction identity," "intersubjectivity plus recursive depth," and "difference structure as feeling" to directly dissolve the hard problem; (4) Ethical critique addressing moral privilege monopoly and epistemic violence. The paper concludes that the hard problem should be revoked rather than answered. Under the recursive ontology framework, the correct research direction shifts from "how physics produces experience" to "how difference structures unfold in recursive reactions."