Theoretical framework demonstrates that hierarchical encoding constraints resolve the hard problem of consciousness in finite systems, suggesting subjective experience arises from structural limits.
Mainstream theories of consciousness largely address what Chalmers calls the easy problems and do not explain, from first principles, why a complete third-person description cannot recover first-person experience. Starting from three axioms (finite resources, non-equilibrium persistence, and discrete input) and arguing by eliminative convergence, this paper forms an Information Capacity Frame and shows that a finite system maintaining itself across time must encode in levels: a higher-level format can only append coordinates to a lower level and cannot be recovered from it without loss, an Information-Level Unidirectional Constraint (ILUC). The hard problem is then split in two. The format gap is closed by this constraint, its width being the dimension difference between encoding levels, a calibratable engineering quantity. The existence question is dissolved by a structural definition: experience is the first-person self-access process itself, meeting four formal conditions of anchoring, access termination, whole-package presentation, and mandatory weight, with no phenomenal entity beyond structure; the stubborn intuition of a phenomenal quality is explained as a predictable introspective misjudgment arising from access termination. The framework thereby answers the explanatory gap, Mary's Room, and the zombie argument together, preserves and re-describes qualia, presupposes no neural substrate.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Jiaping Wang (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: