Deliberative Representation in Formal Philosophy

This thesis explores the legitimacy of political representation in deliberative democracies. More specifically, it investigates (i) how a system of proportional representation should be designed in a deliberative democracy, and (ii) what conditions should be met for deliberations among representatives to be democratically legitimate. First, it is argued that a system of proportional representation that is fair to individuals is multidimensional. Two committee ranking procedures are then characterized to address the problem of plural identities and the problem of negative representation. Finally, a representative deliberation procedure is defined to justify representatives’ changing their minds away from those that they hold in common with their constituents, under certain conditions. In doing so, the thesis contributes to fundamental debates in normative democratic theory and formal political theory on how the ideal of legitimate political outcomes are defined in representative deliberative democracies, and how systems of representative democracy and deliberative institutions are modelled.