This article examines whether states may alter the legal classification of coercive interstate conduct by describing it as self-defence, transnational law enforcement, or strategic necessity. It analyses three episodes of United States practice: the killing of Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani in Iraq; the operation that captured and removed Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in 2026; and the threatened force and tariff pressure used to pursue control of Greenland in 2025–2026. The article argues that these episodes reflect legal recharacterisation rather than a new doctrine. Article 2(4) depends on the nature and effects of conduct, not the acting state's chosen label. The Soleimani strike lacked sufficient justification under Article 51 and also implicated Iraq's sovereignty. The operation in Venezuela remained an interstate use of force despite its law-enforcement framing. In the Greenland episode, military threats engaged Article 2(4), while tariff pressure raised issues of non-intervention, self-determination, and coercive territorial acquisition.
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Chairul Fahmi (2026) studied this question.
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