This article provides a novel analysis of drivers of the heterogeneity in positions of European far-right parties on Russia. Concentrating on roll-call votes in the European Parliament, we theorize that due to pragmatic constraints, far-right members of European Parliament from larger domestic parties and those in government will be less likely to explicitly support Russia, expectations that are largely supported by our results. Furthermore, given that our data range from a year before the reinvasion of Ukraine in 2022 to more than 2 years after, we chart and test changes in voting over time for far-right members of European Parliament. Our theorizing and results demonstrate how electoral viability and strategic calculations constrain far-right manoeuvrers and position-taking in much the same manner as other types of political parties, therefore adding to our knowledge of far-right behaviour not simply concerning Russia but in other policy areas as well.
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Wondreys et al. (2026) studied this question.
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