This paper challenges the move from two-dimensional semantic distinctions to conclusions about the metaphysical separability of consciousness. It develops a recursive-ontological perspective according to which cognition, supposition, linguistic expression, and theoretical assessment are events within causally continuous relations. The central claim is not that public language can express only one meaning, nor that semantic distinctions are unreal. Rather, distinctions between modes of semantic evaluation do not, without further argument, establish independent ontological dimensions. A theory intended for public assessment must specify how its semantic dimensions are identified, coordinated, and applied through shared rules; it must then independently justify any transition from those rules to claims about possible worlds and phenomenal consciousness. The paper applies this demand to zombie conceivability, first-person authority, and the explanatory gap. It concludes that two-dimensional semantics may clarify modal and epistemic distinctions, but cannot by itself establish an ontological fracture between physical organization and experience.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Gangbei Niu (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: