Scale-Dependent Inequity Aversion and the Architecture of Meta-Centralization: How Multi-Agent Ecosystems Neutralize Ultimatum Rejection

Behavioral economics demonstrates that economic agents in dyadic (1:1) bargaining routinely sacrifice personal material gain to punish asymmetric surplus allocations—a phenomenon formalized as inequity aversion. However, modern platform economics reveals an empirical paradox: when asymmetric distributions are embedded within large-scale multi-agent (1:N) ecosystems, participant rejection rates collapse to zero despite extreme surplus concentration. This paper formalizes the Scale-Dependent Inequity Aversion model to resolve this paradox. We demonstrate that scaling an economic interaction from a dyad to a multi-agent network systematically alters behavioral utility parameters through three distinct mechanisms: (1) the attenuation of perceived counterparty intentionality, (2) the institutionalization of social comparison via social proof, and (3) the collapse of perceived efficacy in inflicting retaliatory damage. We show that platform architects intentionally deploy decentralized narratives and fractionalized risk structures to transition interactions from dyadic bargaining games into multi-agent compliance equilibria. We term this structural strategy Meta-Centralization: the masking of centralized value extraction behind decentralized user architectures.