Conventional Counterspace Conduct and the Outer Space Treaty

Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty does not comprehensively prohibit conventional weapons, anti-satellite capabilities or all military activity in outer space. That proposition does not create a legal vacuum. Conduct not specifically prohibited by Article IV remains governed by the United Nations Charter, the other provisions of the Treaty, applicable rules of international law, registration and liability regimes, and—during armed conflict—applicable international humanitarian law. The legally accurate description is therefore under-specific regulation, not unregulated space warfare. This article reassesses a proposal, made in version 1.0 (July 2026) of the author's Orbital Denial and the Limits of the Outer Space Treaty, to use Article VI authorisation and continuing supervision as the anchor for nationally implemented restrictions against irresponsible conventional counterspace conduct. Article VI is important but narrower than that proposal suggested. It imposes international responsibility for national space activities and requires authorisation and continuing supervision of non-governmental national activities. It does not itself create prescriptive jurisdiction over unrelated foreign persons, authorise economic sanctions, or require a State to exclude foreign entities from finance, insurance, procurement or launch services. Those effects require distinct domestic statutory powers and a recognised jurisdictional nexus; they also engage due process, human rights, trade law, comity, blocking legislation and the law of countermeasures. The revised proposal—nationally anchored market conditionality—is modular. Licensing conditions govern national operators. Export controls govern specified goods, software, technology and services within established territorial and nationality jurisdiction. Financial sanctions require a sanctions statute and an independently reviewable designation. Public procurement, insurance and government-backed finance use their own legal bases. International coordination supplies interoperability and legitimacy, but no measure is presented as an obligation derived solely from Article VI. The recommended predicate is conduct-based rather than capability-based: destructive testing that creates long-lived debris; unnotified or non-consensual harmful interference; conduct creating a serious and foreseeable collision or cascading-debris risk; evasion of registration and supervision; refusal of required Article IX consultation; and material assistance knowingly supplied to such conduct. Safeguards include a clear jurisdictional nexus, published criteria, evidence thresholds, notice, reasons, independent review, proportionality, time limits, humanitarian and safety exceptions, delisting, and periodic multilateral assessment. The mechanism is offered as a policy model, not a statement of existing law. Working draft v1.2.0, October 2026. Independent legal and policy scholarship; not legal advice.