The FASTER Directive requires Member States to recognize a common electronic tax residence certificate (eTRC) and deliver withholding tax relief through fast-track procedures operated by intermediaries. This article argues that FASTER creates a system pursuant to which the legal significance attached to the certificate exceeds the coordination of the residence determination beneath it: the eTRC records a unilateral domestic finding, yet treaty relief may turn on unresolved dual residence and further treaty conditions unknown to the intermediary. A typology of four potential mismatches between an investor account and relief entitlement shows that the FASTER Directive, while not giving rise to such mismatches and mitigating some of them may amplify their consequences. This contrasts with social security coordination, where an EU conflict rule stands behind the binding A1 certificate. This gap can be traced back to Member State incentives. The article concludes by presenting a conflict-detection instrument designed to make competing residence claims visible.
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Semen Feldman (2026) studied this question.
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