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How do rippers (dishonest participants) deceive other participants and evade punishment in illegal online market? This article studies the emerging illegal online market of sexual fiction in China where anonymity and information asymmetry hinder participants from evaluating the trustworthiness of exchange partners across multiple online platforms. Through online observation and interviews, the research studies how rippers imitate trustworthy signals. By extending signalling theory, this article proposes executing mimicry through genuine features and actions, and identifies three strategies: substitutions, bait-and-switch and contract loopholes. These strategies highlight the decoupling between signal cost and credibility. Participants cannot distinguish between genuine exchange partners and dishonest one based on signal cost, resulting in a new sub-form of pooling equilibrium: signal-erosive equilibrium. This explains the prevalence of rippers.
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Natalie Mae Evelyn (2026) studied this question.
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