This article unpacks the multifaceted notion of academic freedom by examining three types of freedom: the freedom others give to us; the freedom we give ourselves; and the freedom we give to others. We hold that the university is traditionally obligated to contribute to the common good in its devotion to the unfettered pursuit of truth, expertise, and morality. We take freedom to be the opposite of enslavement, a panoptic concept, individually and collectively experienced, expressed in the context of groups, institutions, societies, and cultures, and understood constitutionally, legally, and ethically in terms of the academy’s rights and privileges. The article further examines the various permissions, requirements, and expectations that academic freedom implies. Although they intersect, the three freedoms function differently but they are all humane values, ideals to aspire to, and principles to guide behaviour. The analysis is cast generally with specific reference to examples drawn mainly from the USA, with broader theoretical and practical applications beyond the USA. These freedoms may be usurped, and their defence is necessary especially when political, legal, and institutional protections falter. If the academy is to live and thrive, the freedoms that others give us, we give ourselves, and we give others need to be defended and reclaimed as humane values by academics and the wider public.
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Jorgensen et al. (2026) studied this question.
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