The central problem is that standard elicitation mechanisms assume sincere reporting, yet ministries possess both the incentive and the capacity to persuade or pressure respondents. The analysis characterises the conditions under which a persuasion-robust elicitation rule exists and specifies the trade-off between representational fidelity and strategic resilience. The framework is evaluated through a replication-based design analysis of a before-after-control-impact estimator under a declared variance structure (between-cluster SD = 6.0, residual SD = 4.5, intraclass correlation = 0.64), with power estimated across 2000 design cells. The results indicate that detecting a 5 percentage-point effect at 80% power requires 54 clusters, and that the minimum detectable effect declines as cluster count increases. The paper concludes that persuasion-robust elicitation is feasible only when paired with credible institutional constraints on ministry agenda-setting, and it derives a governance incentive-distortion bound that specifies the maximum permissible persuasion intensity for a given level of smallholder representational guarantee.
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Goma-Ngoma et al. (2026) studied this question.
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