Coercing to win in war—how to assess the prospects of success and can it work in Ukraine?

The Western military strategy debate on the Ukraine War has focused on defeating Russian forces inside Ukraine militarily and the associated risk of Russian nuclear escalation. Too little attention has been given to the possibility of Ukraine achieving victory-by-coercion, a negotiated outcome carrying a lower risk of nuclear escalation than victory-by-defeat. This article fills this gap by outlining the conditions for victory-by-coercion and applying them to the Ukraine War. The analysis shows that the US-led coercive strategy employed against Russia failed to impose enough economic and military pain to create the urgency for compliance in Moscow that coercive victory requires. It also finds that coercion must be paired with credible assurances that punitive measures will cease if demands are met, and that the unwillingness to offer Russia positive incentives to withdraw decreased the likelihood of a negotiated solution.