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Liquid democracy lets members of computer agriculture cooperatives delegate votes to trusted peers, but the delegation graph that carries those votes is itself a governance surface: an adaptive adversary who inserts Sybil identities can concentrate delegated weight without ever controlling a majority of members. the present analysis treats the problem as a design question rather than an empirical one and asks what structural property of the delegation graph bounds the quorum legitimacy that an adaptive Sybil campaign can manufacture. It develops a formal model in which delegation is a directed weighted graph, Sybil infiltration is an adaptive process constrained by a per-period creation budget, and quorum legitimacy is defined as the share of decisive weight traceable to distinct enfranchised members. From this model it derives an integrity bound: for a delegation graph with conductance φ and a Sybil budget b per period, the weight an adaptive adversary can concentrate before detection is bounded by a function of φ, b and the graph's expansion, and quorum legitimacy collapses only when that bound exceeds a threshold tied to the cooperative's decision rule. The bound is used to compare three delegation regimes—open transitive delegation, capped delegation and attested delegation—and to specify the conditions under which each preserves quorum legitimacy. The contribution is a governance-integrity bound that converts a graph-theoretic property of liquid democracy into an auditable design constraint for computer agriculture cooperatives, together with a set of propositions that link delegation caps, attestation and graph conductance to the resilience of cooperative voting.
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Mwansa Chibale Nkandu (2026) studied this question.
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