Rapid developments in artificial intelligence, brain–computer interfaces (BCIs), and other neurotechnologies challenge established understandings of embodiment, personal identity, and human agency. Cyborg enhancement and mind uploading raise fundamental questions about what constitutes a human person and whether personal identity can survive technological transformation. This article approaches these questions from the perspective of Christian theological anthropology, focusing on the patristic understanding of the human person as a unity of body and soul. Drawing on the concept of hypostasis developed by Maximus the Confessor and further articulated by John of Damascus, it examines the anthropological assumptions underlying contemporary visions of posthuman transformation. It argues that the reproduction of cognitive and psychological characteristics through mind uploading does not by itself establish continuity of the original person, since personal identity cannot be reduced to informational or functional continuity. Cyborg technologies present a different theological challenge: technological augmentation need not undermine personhood when it occurs within the continuing embodied life of a particular subject, although functional integration alone is not sufficient to establish numerical personal identity. The article also employs the “golden ratio” as a modern interpretive model for illuminating Maximian patterns of unity-in-difference. It concludes that patristic anthropology can critically engage technological transformation without rejecting innovation or reducing the human person to an informational or computational entity.
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Vladimir Cvetković (2026) studied this question.
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