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Distributed secondary frequency control exchanges neighbour telemetry, which false data injection (FDI) can corrupt. An open-source controller defends this exchange with a fixed-threshold rule that discards neighbour values deviating from the local frequency by more than a threshold. In a reduced-order six-inverter simulation, this rule does not stop attacks that stay inside the threshold (1.6–1.8 Hz steady-state error), is harmed by small thresholds, and at four of six attacker locations performs worse than no defence (up to 18.9 Hz). We evaluate Prediction-Residual Gating (PRG): a per-link disturbance-augmented observer whose one-step residual is tested against a threshold calibrated on a trusted window (updated from accepted samples only) and widened by a physically derived allowance for credible load steps. Rejected samples are replaced by the model prediction for a bounded time, then the link is quarantined. Over 3,440 deterministic simulation runs, PRG removed abrupt-offset, adaptive-stealth and fixed-value attacks (steady-state error 0.002 Hz, detection delay 0 s) with no false alarm in 1.1 million honest link-steps, and tolerated ±30% time-constant error, doubled noise and 30% packet loss. Limitations are reported explicitly: offsets below about 0.12 Hz and slow creeps (≤0.005 Hz/s) remain undetected, the formal worst-case error bound is unchanged, and an optional drift monitor quarantines honest links. Results are simulation-only, the work has not been peer reviewed, and no novelty over existing observer-based detection is claimed. Source code, tests, raw results and reproduction commands are in the linked GitHub repository.
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Sajjad et al. (2026) studied this question.
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