We posit that Singapore fulfils the role of a geopolitical swing state but with deliberate understatement. This role entails a temporal process of shaping the geopolitical landscape across time. In this regard, hedging should be viewed as an iterative risk management process. This is to account for how Singapore’s agency has been undergirded by shifting risk perceptions and practices in response to evolving challenges. These iterative practices take three forms: (1) the conduct of foreign policy towards major powers with caution through acts of restraint; (2) implementing supplementary buffering policies relevant in tackling risks associated with the pursuit of policies towards major powers; and (3) adaptability of hedging strategies in light of evolving risk appraisals and changing circumstances. We illuminate the framework of iterative hedging through three main and evolutionary cases: Singapore expedites the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s integration through free trade pacts with great powers; Singapore’s moderating role within ASEAN; and Singapore’s role in assisting with China’s socialisation into East Asian regionalism. And there will be two extreme cases demonstrating limitations to the swing state’s hedging: Singapore–Taiwan relations under China’s watchful shadow; and Singapore–US relations. Above all, Singapore conducts its foreign policy through social strategies of cajoling friendly states through bonhomie and quiet rational persuasion.
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Han et al. (2026) studied this question.
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