External Constraint and Domestic Contention: Power Realignment and Political Violence in France and Italy (2026)

This article examines how power realignment in the international system is transmitted into domestic contention in European states, focusing on the wave of political violence in France and Italy in 2026. It develops a three-level analytical model. The model combines neoclassical realism and two-level game theory (systemic level) with theories of legitimacy and power (institutional level) and the study of contentious politics (interactional level). Five working propositions are derived from it. The empirical design has three parts: a structured, focused comparison of France and Italy as most-similar cases; process tracing of the French sequence of September–October 2026, culminating in the 17 October protests; the coding of 11 episodes of collective violence in six European states between January and October 2026. The findings show that redistributive violence follows a causal chain. External constraint is transmitted through budget decisions: the NATO 5% defence spending target, the energy shock following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and rising borrowing costs. The intensity of the resulting violence depends on governments’ institutional capacity to produce consent. Securitising broad protest movements and using escalated force both help shift conflict towards the legitimacy of the state. Historical comparisons place the 2026 episodes in a longer perspective. They range from the interwar gold standard and the French Popular Front to May 1968 and the Italian social pact of 1993. Across these cases, the same external pressures produced violence when adjustment was imposed unilaterally, and negotiated reforms when institutional channels of voice existed. The model is weaker in explaining identity-based violence, which follows a distinct triggering mechanism.