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Decentralized knowledge marketplaces often face an irreconcilable trilemma: Confidentiality (preventing unauthorized scraping and intellectual property theft), Verifiability (enabling decentralized peers to inspect and validate accuracy), and Incentive Alignment (preventing Sybil cartels and collusion). Pure cryptographic zero-knowledge systems conceal data entirely, rendering qualitative peer review impossible; conversely, plaintext crowdsourcing models leak IP to the public, destroying creation incentives. In this paper, we propose EduChain, a dual cryptographic and game-theoretic framework that resolves this trilemma. EduChain couples a Poseidon-based zk-SNARK authorship commitment scheme with an On-Chain Conditional Key Escrow governed by a novel Review Bond Staking Rollover protocol. To eliminate collusion and reviewer-author bribery, we design a Verifiable Random Assignment (VRA) mechanism parameterized by an on-chain entropy beacon, bounding the cartel hijacking probability to O(1 / C(M, k)). Furthermore, we prove that under our non-inflationary 70/20/10 purchase settlement model, wash-trading cartels face a guaranteed negative-sum capital depletion rate of -10% per transaction, proving that honest participation forms a strict subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We deploy and benchmark EduChain on an EVM Layer-2 environment. Experimental evaluations across 83 continuous integration test vectors demonstrate that our Groth16 verification requires only 256,160 gas (~$0.006 on Arbitrum/Base) and client-side proof generation completes in under 820 ms, establishing EduChain as a practical, mathematically secure paradigm for decentralized intellectual property evaluation.
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Jeong Hoon Kim (2026) studied this question.
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