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IN "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics" ,lOur Knowledge of the External World, 2 and "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter", 3 Russell presents a phenomenalistic reduction of physical objects.On this theory, the external world becomes a physical space of six dimensions, which must be logically constructed by a three-dimensional ordering of three-dimensional phenomenal spaces.In what follows, we will consider Russell's varying views, from causal realism in The Problems of Philosophy,4 through phenomenalism, to neutral monism in The Analysis ofMind, 5 on the nature of the external world.We will pay particular attention to the relation between physical and phenomenal space, and the status ofthe causal theory ofperception.1. Realism (1912) In The Problems ofPhilosophy, Russell distinguishes a single "real" space ofscience from the "apparent" spaces ofperception.He begins with various cases of perceptual relativity, illusion, etc., and from these infers that those object which are immediately known to us are not the physical objects which the layman might take them to be.Rather, what are immediately known are sense-data, these being caused by, and so in some sense "corresponding" to, physical ob-I "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics", Scientia, 4 (1914), reprinted as Chapter VIII of Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (London, 1918).2 Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy (London, 1914).3 "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter", Monist, 25 (1915), reprinted as Chapter VII of Mysticism and Logic.
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