Appraisal theories explain how a subject evaluates what an encounter means for its goals and well-being, but not how the subject constructs a determinate emotion from the feeling that the evaluation leaves open. I present the Constructivist Interpretation Theory of Emotion (CITE), the interpretive thesis of the Constructivist Semiotic Model of Emotions. CITE holds that interpretation, rather than appraisal, constitutes emotional meaning: appraisal, prediction, categorization, and physiological affect constrain emotional possibility, and emotion arises only when an agent commits to one interpretation by binding an emotion concept to a referent under a governing goal and marking the commitment with an identifier. I compare appraisal frameworks and CITE across five structural divergences: where emotional meaning arises, where feeling stands, what role emotion concepts play, what role appraisal plays, and whether interpretive error is possible. Appraisal operates on the situation and succeeds when it gets the situation right; interpretation operates on the feeling and succeeds when its construct meets a concept's identity conditions under the goal. A worked case, one bear and two emotions, holds appraisal and feeling fixed while the emotion changes with the goal. The strongest claim is that an agent can appraise correctly and still construct the wrong emotion. Working paper 5 of 8 in the series on the frameworks of How to Design an Emotion: The Deconstruction and Computation of Emotional Meaning from First Principles (Universal Moral Concepts III, New Intellectual LLC, 2026; ISBN 979-8-9898135-9-9 paperback, 979-8-9898135-3-7 Kindle). The book is the full treatment. Book page: https://newintellectual.com/how-to-design-an-emotion; related: Part IV. Buy on Amazon.
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Cézjah (2026) studied this question.
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